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1. Introduction 
 
In his article, “Consider the Squirrel: Freaks, Vermin and Value in the Ruin(s) 
of Nature,” Nicholas Holm argues that environmentalism naturally tends 
towards socially conservative logics. If this is true, then we have to question 
what seems otherwise to be a natural fit between the agendas of 
environmental protection and the other laudable social goals that 
environmentalists usually support. Non-violence, de-militarisation and 
disarmament, participatory democracy, social justice: while it is possible for 
one to be an environmentalist and not particularly care about these things, in 
practice we typically find that those who care about the environment also 
have “progressive” views on these issues, as is certainly evinced by the 
parliamentary wings of the Green movement (Green Party of Canada, 
“Platform;” Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “More Issues;” Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen, “Uns Geht's Ums Ganze;” Aria-Maldonado 2007, 234). But 
perhaps this is purely contingent. If the Green movement and Green political 
thought is based on a fundamentally conservative logic, we might find that 
socially progressive policy and environmental protection are in tension at 
quite a deep level, and that green activity towards socially progressive ends is 
ultimately undermined by this. 
In this paper I will examine a number of justifications for environmental 
concern, and show why all except for the (broadly) anthropocentric 
demonstrate problematic conservative logics that incline them towards 
socially conservative positions. Environmentalists would do best to take up an 
anthropocentric, or at least anthropogenic, defence of green values if they 
want to pair it with a progressive social politics. This is not to say that 
environmentalists are, in practice, socially conservative. Deep democracy, for 
example, or an emphasis on grassroots democratisation, political mobilisation 
and community involvement in decision-making, is something that tends to be 
favoured by Greens (Dobson 2007, 106; Benton 1993, 38). Those for whom 
environmental sustainability and care are a core part of their politics typically 
oppose corporate-bureaucratic systems that operate outside democratic 
political institutions (Grove-White 1993, 27). The ‘father of conservatism’, 
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Edmund Burke, on the other hand, considered the impulse to extend 
democratic participation as widely as possible savage, “the literal death of 
Western civilization (O’Neill 2007, 127; Burke 1968, 372).” In addition, 
whereas Burke’s conservatism was “entirely satisfied [with] the inequality 
which grows out of the nature of things by time, custom, succession, 
accumulation, permutation, and improvement of property (Burke 1852, 403),” 
Greens tend to be in favour of social justice issues, such as gender equality 
(Warren 1990), Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights, and the rights 
of the poor and marginalised (Bullard & Johnson 2000; Datye 1997, 42). 
Environmentalist organisations such as Green Cross advocate strongly for 
nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament (Green Cross, 
“Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament”). Despite the occasional 
concern shown by organisations such as the conservative New Zealand 
National Party’s “Bluegreens” working group, Greens do not usually actually 
advocate for conservative causes in practice (NPPAGEC, “Bluegreens”). 
I am not arguing in this paper, therefore, that environmentalists tend also 
to be conservatives. Rather, following Holm, I suggest that the conservative 
logics that can underlie the Green view, if we understand it in particular ways, 
can cause a tendency towards social conservatism. If we justify our 
environmental concern in the problematic ways I outline, but conservatism is 
resisted in terms of social policy, there is some cognitive dissonance between 
the Green environmental and social views. Given the Green focus on the 
environment, there is good reason to think that there is not a necessary 
connection, or even a natural affinity, between Green thought and social 
justice goals. It certainly seems that, often enough, social justice goals are 
instrumentally useful for Greens, given that the environment is their central 
focus – arguably the environment, as an empirical matter, tends to be 
protected better when social justice is also protected (Porritt 2005, 10). If this 
tension between the social and environmental features of Green thought 
continues, Greens may advocate for social justice goals, when it suits them – 
but they also may not. This tension between social justice and 
environmentalism exists for Greens on a fundamental level, even if they do 
not often have to confront it. However, sometimes we might truly have to 
trade one value off against the other. 
Green opposition to interference in the environment can be understood 
in four main ways, only one of which, I argue, manages to avoid conservative 
tendencies. First, we understand Green opposition to interference with the 
environment as the preservation of an underlying order to nature itself. 
Second, Greens act so as to maximise diversity, usually in the form of a 
concern for biodiversity specifically. Third, Greens can justify environmental 
protection based on the precautionary principle, which bids us to take care 
when making drastic changes to complex systems. Finally, environmental 
protection is justified on anthropocentric grounds; that is, due to the benefit it 
has for us (or, if we were to be slightly broader, the benefit to non-human 
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animals, though still due to the features that we value in humans). According 
to this view, we protect the environment because it achieves our own goals, 
and actualises our own values. In the following sections, I will briefly 
examine each position and its implications for green politics that are 
compatible with socially progressive politics. Ultimately I argue that we 
should adopt an anthropocentric justification for environmental concern. This 
does not necessarily rest on a mere interest in continued economic growth, on 
the argument that our future economic health rests on a healthy environment 
(though I would certainly agree that this is this case). Instead, it is a matter of 
deciding what it is that we value (as opposed to claiming the intrinsic value of 
certain things), preferably through open public deliberation, and acting so as 
to bring about such values. 
 
2. An Underlying Order 
 
The view that there is an underlying order to nature that we ought to respect is 
the most obviously conservative of the alternatives outlined above. In fact, it 
is directly analogous to Burke’s own view. According to Burke, there is an 
underlying order to the social world that we tamper with at our peril. 
Certainly, basing their opposition on the idea of an underlying order would 
make environmentalists, along with Burke, at the very least anti-radical. 
According to this view, “[n]either man nor nature starts each day and age de 
novo. Instead, both build on what has gone before, and in building sustain, in 
sustaining renew” (Pappin 1993, 86). The radical approach, in contrast, is that 
problems with the current order cannot be solved within the framework of that 
order, and a fundamentally new order must take its place. 
This does not mean that change can never occur. It is not change per se 
that is the problem: change is essential, if we want to avoid a static, atrophied 
world. However, Burke believed that changes ought to be made “without 
violence to essential structures… throughout these changes, something 
[should remain] abiding, substantially and essentially unchanged” (Pappin 
1993, 78). For conservatives, radicals “do not recognize the good that exists 
and, in their impatience to cure the evil, destroy the good without replacing it 
with the better” (Freeman 1980, 3). 
An opposition to substantial change on the grounds of damage to 
underlying structures does seem to be a perspective contrary to that of 
progressive politics. As Andrew Dobson writes: 
 
Since the French Revolution it has been a theme of left-wing thought 
that the existence of a concrete natural order of things with which human 
beings should conform and not tamper is a form of medieval mumbo-
jumbo used by the right to secure and ossify privilege (Dobson 2007, 
19). 
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Environmentalist thought that aims at the preservation of this underlying 
nature shares troubling logics with social conservatism. If there is, as Holm 
puts it, a “sense that there exist ‘proper’ forms and arrangements of nature” 
(Holm 2012, 58), without the necessity of specifying precisely what it is that 
is valuable about such an order aside from its mere existence, then change 
away from the present (or prior idealised) state is always degradation, never 
improvement.  
We could argue that the underlying order develops over time, and this 
historical development is what we need to preserve. It is certainly the case 
that if the physical environment is built through aeons of accumulated 
endeavour, we cannot possibly hope to rival it in many respects through our 
rational design. We simply cannot hope to capture the complexity of the 
underlying order of nature through our engineering (Botkin 1990, 102-3). 
Anything we do to this nature-as-wilderness is, therefore, taking it from a 
more ideal to a less ideal state of affairs. 
But all this is done without at any point needing to elaborate on what is 
good about this underlying order; its value is intrinsic, not derived from its 
meeting certain criteria of value. This view is clearly based on conservative 
logics, and one could argue that Burke would be in complete agreement with 
it (Freeman 1980, 3). After all, if we are concerned with the development over 
time of complex systems that, unobstructed, create an ideal underlying order, 
and we see as destructive any radical attempts to engineer such an order, why 
restrict this just to the physical environment? Society, too is an extremely 
complex system, well beyond our ability to engineer with any kind of 
precision or confidence. Society has also developed through processes that are 
outside our explicit control. By the same reasoning we ought to hesitate to 
change anything in society lest we risk undermining the underlying, 
intrinsically valuable social order. In short, if we want to attribute an 
underlying order to nature, we cannot easily avoid the same logic applying to 
society as well. 
 
3. Diversity 
 
An alternative to the belief in an underlying order is to claim that we ought to 
avoid interference with the natural world because doing so undermines its 
diversity. This is, in some ways, very similar to having an underlying order, 
except it provides a more definite account of what it is we find valuable in 
such an order. Rather than just somewhat unreflexively advocating for a 
particular order merely because it is the one that has happened to develop 
historically, the biodiversity approach supports any order, human-built or 
natural, that maximises biological diversity. As it happens, the biodiversity 
that develops when there has been no human interference, when the order is 
‘natural’, tends to be more diverse than when the order has been interfered 
with significantly by human beings: “historically, ecosystems that have been 
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significantly altered by human beings are less complex” (DeLancey 2012, 
27). There are certainly exceptions, such that the re-wilding of former 
wilderness can sometimes bring about a superior state of affairs. Nevertheless, 
generally it is the case that evolution, when left alone, “tends to maximize the 
number and kinds of organisms in a region” (DeLancey 2012, 28). 
This approach certainly has more in favour of it than the underlying 
order account. Certainly, if it were the case that proponents of biodiversity 
aimed at diversity above all else in practice, and that we could agree that this 
is what we should ultimately value, this view would escape the conservatism 
found in the underlying order account. However, this is generally not the case: 
as Holm points out, “while biodiversity might imply a desire to maximize 
difference in the natural world, in practice it tends to focus on the preservation 
of difference as it currently exists” (Holm 2012, 61). It is more concerned 
with “rendering the present eternal – moving ourselves and our planet out of 
the flow of history” (Bowker 2004, 112). There is a tension between the 
support for biodiversity, in terms of preserving the current distribution of 
plants and animals, and the opposition to global warming, which might, after 
all, increase biodiversity in the long run, if we consider that the biodiversity 
of the world was higher when we had temperate forests in the Arctic (Bowker 
2004, 112). In other words, if supporters of biodiversity were consistent in 
holding that biodiversity is the ultimate value, they might be obliged to 
support activities that lead to climate change. 
Preserving the current diversity rather than considering alternate states 
of affairs that might have more diversity overall, though composed of 
different entities in different arrangements, is merely another iteration of the 
conservative logic underpinning the underlying order account. On the other 
hand, truly attempting to maximise diversity at all costs, ignoring its effect on 
currently existing organisms, is troublingly callous. We do tend to think that 
the entities that exist have some kind of higher status than merely possible 
entities. Hence, advocates for biodiversity must either compromise their view 
that biodiversity has a deep, fundamental value or, if they truly advocate for 
biodiversity, abandon all concern for the organisms that currently exist in 
order to bring about whatever ideal state does in fact maximise biodiversity, 
possibly including a warmed world. 
 
4. The Precautionary Principle 
 
Is it necessary to have underlying order or a commitment to diversity in mind 
when opposing change? Rather than opposing certain kinds of change, can 
environmentalists avoid Holm’s critique by instead opposing rates of change? 
After all, just because change is necessary, this does not “imply that all 
changes, regardless of time, intensity, and rate, are desirable” (Botkin 1990, 
71). In this understanding, when environmentalists oppose change it is not 
necessarily to preserve a certain state of affairs; rather, they can oppose 
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change because it operates on such a scale that the effects are drastic and 
unpredictable. As Craig DeLancey points out, 
 
It is simply a fact that we can change a landscape – cut the trees, plow 
the Earth, irrigate it, drain it, poison it, mine it, invert it – many times 
faster than most genotypes can adapt to such changes (DeLancey 2012, 
33). 
 
In other words, we ought to be cautious when making changes where the 
outcome might be very different than what we expect. The scale of our 
activities are so great that our actions have truly global, and potentially 
irreversible, consequences, and we have very little reason to have confidence 
that we understand the natural world well enough to alter it in predictable 
ways. The furore over the spread of genes from genetically modified corn to 
wild non-modified varieties is a case in point (Stewart, Halfhill & Warwick 
2003). Our increasingly potent ability to alter the world together with our lack 
of knowledge leads to the precautionary principle: “If we cannot know the 
outcome of an intervention in the environment but suspect that it may be 
dangerous, then we are best advised… not to intervene at all” (Dobson 2007, 
59). 
Unfortunately, the precautionary principle might not be able to do as 
much work as we would like, as it cannot be limited in principle just to 
environmental caution. Certainly the same line of thinking can be applied to 
social issues as well. Burke may have believed that there is an underlying 
order that we should not tamper with, but there is no reason he had to have 
thought so in order to maintain his conservative prescriptions. Social 
conservatives can, and in fact often do, utilise the precautionary principle just 
as easily to justify their opposition to progressive social change as they can by 
pointing to an underlying order. For example, it is equally straightforward to 
oppose gay marriage due to its potential to cause drastic and unpredictable 
change to society as it is to oppose it due it supposedly being an attack on the 
‘natural’ order. 
If we believe that our knowledge of the environment is still incomplete, 
and that we should therefore proceed with caution in altering it, the same 
could be said of change to our social systems. We just do not know for sure 
what the long-term social impacts will be in extending the definition of 
marriage to include homosexual couples. Social progressives certainly have 
confidence that the outcome will be positive, and there are a lot of good 
reasons to think it will be. But if we are to be honest we have to admit that the 
complexity of social changes means that, despite our confidence and despite 
the probably-well-deserved scorn heaped on the conservative moral panic 
about marriage equality, we just cannot know for sure. The precautionary 
principle, due to the fact that it can be equally-well mobilised to block social 
change as environmental change, does not allow us to avoid Holm’s charge 
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that environmentalism relies on conservative logics, or at the very least 
incline in that direction. 
 
5. Anthropocentrism 
 
There is one account (or, really, family of accounts) that can give a 
determinate sense to the precautionary principle, yet is not underpinned by 
conservative logics: Greens ought to oppose intervention in the natural 
environment because it has negative consequences for human beings, prevents 
human being from achieving their ends, or works against our ability to 
actualise our values. This anthropocentric account adopts features from the 
alternatives, yet is justified on different grounds. For example, it may indeed 
be that an underlying order has developed over time, but we should not 
advocate for such an order merely for its own sake, because it has ‘intrinsic’ 
value, but because we know that such an order works for us. What, exactly, it 
means for something to ‘work for us’ is a matter for discussion amongst those 
affected by the order; nevertheless, this is something that can, in principle, be 
settled. Such values are ours; they are not based on the intrinsic value of a 
particular underlying order, or a particular history. We can imagine alternative 
states of affairs that work for us equally well based on such criteria. We can 
provide an account of what it would mean for a society to work for us, and we 
can imagine different societies that better actualise these values. We can also 
find that our values change over time, perhaps due to including more points of 
view (the perspective of animals, perhaps?), or due to rethinking our 
fundamental commitments based on public reasoning and criticism. States of 
affairs judged in regards to our anthropogenic values are at least potentially 
criticisable and revisable: we can openly discuss whether we should, after all, 
hold such values, whether states of affairs are to the good, and whether and 
how we can weigh specific goods against each other. 
In the context of biodiversity, we can support the maximisation of 
diversity, but instead of this being merely for its own sake, and hence having 
no regard for the organisms that currently exist, we can instead see non-
human entities as having value in the same way that humans do, and hence 
the right to life. At first blush this may seem non-anthropocentric, but in fact 
our concern for non-human life must be based on what we see as valuable to 
humans. As Stephen Avery puts it, our concern for non-human life is based 
on a deep anthropocentrism that relies on “a connection between humans and 
the world, a connection that has roots in the human condition” (Avery 2004, 
32, italics mine). That is, if what we see as giving rights to human beings, or 
creating our duties to them, or providing them with dignity, is also found in 
the non-human world, then the non-human world has value too. As we would 
not approve of the extinction of a culture for the instrumental end of diversity 
in the long run, we ought not treat a species in this way (though what gives a 
species value – whether this is due to its benefit to the individuals of which 
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the species is composed, or is something intrinsic – is a matter of debate) 
(Agar 1995). 
Finally, an anthropocentric account allows us to determine which states 
of affairs we should be cautious to avoid. If we base our account on 
anthropocentric value, we can have an open discussion about whether the 
potential costs of an activity outweigh the benefits, rather than simply 
opposing all change. Certainly, the persistence of the human species is 
generally, if not universally, something we value (though perhaps it does not 
have any value if we were not around to value it) (Overall 2012, 192-4). 
Greens argue that “the scale of human activity relative to the biosphere’s 
capacity to absorb and sustain it has increased to the point where long-term 
human survival and the biosphere’s integrity are put in doubt” (Dobson 2007, 
24). There is, then, “no grounds for supposing that we are not in the position 
of the proverbial man, falling from a 20-storey building, who was heard to 
call out ‘so far so good’ as he passed the sixth floor” (Benton 1994, 36). A 
lack of caution is dangerous for us and for the continued actualisation of our 
own values: considering the scale and novelty of our interventions in the 
natural world, and our misplaced trust in our own competence, we could say, 
not entirely unreasonably, that many of our large-scale activities have at least 
a fair chance of being dangerous and counter-productive in terms of our own 
goals and values. Hence, we can quite easily argue that the costs of business-
as-usual in terms of our environmental impact do not outweigh the benefits, 
while consistently holding that marriage equality, or nuclear disarmament, or 
distributive equality, are worth the risk of potential downsides. 
None of the above accounts suffer from conservative logics provided 
that they are ultimately grounded in anthropogenic value rather than the 
supposed intrinsic value of the natural world. An underlying order can be 
valued instrumentally, but if we claim it has value intrinsically, or because of 
a history that has intrinsic value, we slide in conservative logics. If we want to 
support biodiversity and socially progressive politics, thinking in 
anthropocentric terms helps us to justify valuing the current distribution of 
organisms on non-arbitrary terms. Finally, we can apply the precautionary 
principle with a much more determinate sense of what we want to achieve 
with it: it is not just change that we oppose, but change that undermines our 
ability to reach our goals and actualise our values. There are specific kinds of 
changes that are unwelcome, as well as specific kinds that might be very 
welcome indeed. Hence, if we as environmentalists want to avoid, at the very 
least, cognitive dissonance between our support for environmental protection 
and progressive politics, and at worst a tendency for the movement to 
unwittingly adopt socially conservative political positions in the long run, we 
ought to justify our concerns with anthropocentric values. 
 
  
Anthropocentrism, Conservatism, and Green Political Thought 9 
WORKS CITED 
 
Agar, Nicholas. (1995) “Valuing Species and Valuing Individuals” 
Environmental Ethics 17: 4 (Winter), 397-415. 
Aria-Maldonado, Manuel. (2007) “An Imaginary Solution? The Green 
Defence of Deliberative Democracy” Environmental Values 16: 2 
(May), 233-252. 
Avery, Stephen. (2004) “The Misbegotten Child of Deep Ecology” 
Environmental Values 13: 1 (February), 31-50. 
Benton, Ted. (1994) “Biology and Social Theory” in Michael Redclift & Ted 
Benton, eds., Social Theory and the Global Environment. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Botkin, Daniel B. (1990) Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the 
Twenty-First Century.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bowker, Geoffrey C. (2004) “Time, Money, and Biodiversity” in Aihwa Ong 
& Stephen J. Collier, eds., Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, 
and Ethics and Environmental Problems.  Malden, MA.: Blackwell. 
Bullard, Robert D. & Glenn S. Johnson. (2000) “Environmental Justice: 
Grassroots Activism and Its Impact of Public Policy Decision Making” 
Journal of Social Issues 56: 3, 555-578. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Uns Geht’s Ums Ganze” Accessed 11th April, 
2013. https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/service-
navigation/english_ID_2000025.html 
Burke, Edmund. (1852) The Works and Correspondence Of Edmund Burke, 
Volume 3. London: F. & J. Rivington. 
Burke, Edmund. (1968) Reflections on the Revolution in France. 
Harmondsworth: Pelican Books. 
Cronon, William. (1995) “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to 
the Wrong Nature,” in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature.  New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Datye, K.R. with Suhas Paranjape & K.J. Joy. (1997) Banking on Biomass: A 
New Strategy for Sustainable Prosperity based on Renewable Energy 
and Dispersed Industrialization. Ahmedabad, India: Centre for 
Environment Education, Nehru Foundation for Development. 
DeLancey, Craig. (2012) “An Ecological Concept of Wilderness” Ethics & 
the Environment 17: 1 (Spring), 25-44. 
Dobson, Andrew. (2007) Green Political Thought, 4th edition. London: 
Routledge. 
Freeman, Michael. (1980) Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political 
Radicalism.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Green Cross, “Nonproliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament,” Accessed 11th 
April, 2013. http://www.gcint.org/what-we-do/nonproliferation-arms-
control-disarmament 
MICHAEL HEMMINGSEN 10 
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “More Issues,” Accessed 21 
December, 2013. https://www.greens.org.nz/campaigns/all 
Green Party of Canada, “Platform,” Accessed 21 December, 2013. 
https://www.greenparty.ca/ 
Grove-White, Robin. (1993) “Environmentalism: A New Moral Discourse?” 
in Kay Milton, ed., Environmentalism: The View from Anthropology.  
London: Routledge. 
Holm, Nicholas. (2012) “Consider the Squirrel: Freaks, Vermin, and Value in 
the Ruin(s) of Nature” Cultural Critique 80: 1 (Winter) 56-95. 
National Party Policy Advisory Group for Environment and Conservation, 
“Bluegreens,” Accessed 11th April, 2013. 
http://www.bluegreens.org.nz/ 
O’Neill, Daniel I. (2007) The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate: Savagery, 
Civilization, and Democracy. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Overall, Christine. (2012) Why Have Children? The Ethical Debat. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pappin, Joseph L. (1993) The Metaphysics of Edmund Burke. New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
Porritt, Jonathon. (2005) Capitalism: As If the World Matters. London: 
Earthscan. 
Stewart, C. Neal, Jr., Matthew D. Halfhill & Suzanne I. Warwick. (2003) 
“Genetic modification: Transgene introgression from genetically 
modified crops to their wild relatives” Nature Review Genetics 4 
(October), 806-817. 
Warren, Karen. (1990) “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminist,” 
Environmental Ethics 12: 2 (Summer), 125-146. 
